

Developments in Routing Security



Oleg Muravskiy

4 June 2019 | ENOG 16

Who We Are

- East and parts of Central Asia
 - Ensure unique holdership •
 - •
 - •



• We manage IP and ASN allocations in Europe, the Middle

Document holdership in the RIPE Database (whois) Enable operators to document use of their address space


Routing Security is in Our DNA

- In 1994, RIPE-181 was the first document published that used a common language to describe routing policies
- We co-developed standards for IRR and RPKI
- We are one of the five RPKI Trust Anchors
- Our Validator tool was the first tool to do Origin Validation

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Routing on the Internet



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Incidents Are Common

• 2017 Routing Security Review by the Internet Society

- 14k incidents
- 10% of all ASes affected
 - 3k ASNs victims of at least one incident
 - 1.5k ASNs caused at least one incident

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Or Worse...


- April 2018
 - **BGP and DNS hijack targeting** Amazon and MyEtherWallet.com
- August 2018
 - Same technique used against several payment systems

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Internet Routing Registry A announces 10.10.x.x to B B announces 10.20.x.x to A,C,D Is A correct? BGP B: "I have 10.20.x.x" В 10.20.x.x A: "I have 10.10.x.x"

Internet Routing Registry (IRR)

- IRRs exist for many years
- LEVEL3, RGNET, TC, CANARIE, ...
- But their accuracy is not great
 - resources only
 - The RADB allows paying customers to create any object
 - Many IRRs do not formally verify holdership






RIPE DB, NTTCOM, RADB, ALTDB, ARIN IRR, BBOI, BELL,

The RIPE Database verifies holdership for the RIPE region

Accuracy – RIPE DB IRR




Valid announcements / covered announcements

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Accuracy – RADB IRR



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
Valid announcements / covered announcements

Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)


- Ties IP addresses and ASNs to digital certificates (X.509) Digitally sign statements from resource holders
- - AS X is authorised to announce my IP prefix Y
 - Signed by the holder of Y
- Operated since 2011 by all RIRs
- Supported by IETF standards



RPKI Needs Two Actions








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
Creating RPKI Objects: Certificate Hierarchy



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Creating RPKI Objects: Hosted vs Non-Hosted



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


Creating RPKI Objects: Running Non-Hosted CA

- Install RPKI CA software
 - Dragon Research Labs, rpki.net RPKI toolkit NLnet Labs Krill
- **Enable non-hosted CA on LIR Portal**
- Setup connection with RIPE NCC CA



Enable Non-Hosted CA on the LIR Portal



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Setup Connection With the RIPE NCC CA

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Creating RPKI Objects: Running non-Hosted CA

- Install RPKI CA software
 - Dragon Research Labs rpki.net RPKI toolkit
 - NLnet Labs Krill
- Enable non-hosted CA on LIR Portal
- Setup connection with RIPE NCC CA
- Generate your resource certificate and get it signed
- **Create your ROA objects**
- Publish your resource certificate and ROA objects in your RPKI repository
- Keep re-publishing your objects (every 24 hours) (from another AS)

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Creating RPKI Objects: Using Hosted CA

- Enable Hosted CA on the LIR Portal
- Create your ROA objects

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Create Your ROA Objects in a Hosted CA

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IPv4 Transfer Listing Service RPKI Dashboard	↓ Create ROAs for selected BGP Announcements	Image: Second state Image: Secon							
RIPE Database	Origin AS Prefix	Current Status							
	AS12654 2001:7fb:fe01::/48	UNKNOWN							
	AS12654 2001:7fb:fe0c::/48	UNKNOWN							
	AS12654 2001:7fb:fe0f::/48	UNKNOWN							
	AS12654 2001:7fb:ff00::/48	UNKNOWN							
	AS12654 2001:7fb:ff01::/48	UNKNOWN							
	→ A\$12654 2001-7fb-ff02749								

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
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Creating RPKI Objects: Using Hosted CA

- Enable Hosted CA on LIR Portal
- Create your ROA objects
- We will publish your objects in our **RPKI** repository
- We will keep your objects up-to-date



Hosted CA for PI End-Users

- By default RPKI for PI resources is managed by the sponsoring LIR
- inetnum object for your resources in RIPE DB
- that maintainer
- ...and enable your own RPKI CA
- Documentation





Your sponsoring LIR could make you a maintainer of an

Then you could link your RIPE NCC Access account to

Hosted CA for PI End-Users

Your account

Your organisation Linked maintainers


Authenticate

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




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Routing validation



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RPKI Validators


RIPE NCC RPKI Validator

- <u>Version 2</u>
- <u>Version 3</u>
- Dragon Research Labs rpki.net RPKI toolkit
- NLnet Labs Routinator
- Cloudflare's OctoRPKI

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Validating Route Announcements



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Validating Route Announcements: Policies

- Prefer VALID over others
- Prefer UNKNOWN over INVALID
- Drop INVALID?

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Invalid == reject ?

- What breaks if you reject invalids?
 - "Mostly nothing" AT&T
 - "5 customer calls in 6 months, all resolved quickly" medium Dutch ISP
 - "Customers appreciate a provider who takes security seriously" – medium Dutch ISP
 - "There are many invalids, but very little traffic is impacted" – very large cloud provider



Origin Validation vs. Path Validation

- ROA-based validation covers only part of the problem BGPsec could solve it, but can't
- Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) Work in progress
- Don't wait, start now

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
Number of Certificates

Number of Certificates



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This graph shows the total number of resource certificates created under the RIR Trust Anchor. One certificate is generated per LIR, listing all eligible Internet number resources



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
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https://certification-stats.ripe.net/

Coverage – RPKI (all RIRs)




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https://lirportal.ripe.net/certification/content/static/statistics/world-roas.html

Accuracy – RPKI (all RIRs)



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https://lirportal.ripe.net/certification/content/static/statistics/world-roas.html

RPKI in some regional countries

Country	ROA Coverage	ROA Accuracy
AM	42,83%	100%
AZ	3,25%	100%
BY	61,37%	100%
EE	19,2%	100%
GE	27,25%	100%
KG	7,05%	100%
KZ	2,35%	100%
LT	20,37%	100%
LV	24,34%	99,76%
MD	65,57%	100%
RU	7,8%	99,83%
IR	67,22%	99,15%
TR	66,91%	99,48%
ТМ	1,82%	100%
TJ	0%	
UA	7,69%	99,59%
UZ	24,31%	100%

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https://lirportal.ripe.net/certification/content/static/statistics/world-roas.html

Yesterday's ROA signing result

	Prefix C	verview (185.229.10	8.0/22)	•							
	Reload this widget by entering a resource hei										
	Routing information (RIS)										
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	No mor	e/less-specific pro	efixes are								
		visible									
	This p	prefix is announce	ed by:								
		05143 - RPKI Status: COUD9 - Cloud 9 Ltd	-								
		RIR information:									
Resource	RIR	Status	Registration	Country							
185.229.108.0/22	RIPE NCC	ALLOCATED	2017-10-31	GE							
	Shov	v IANA Registry Informa	ation								
Showing results for 185.22	9.108.0/22 as of 20	19-06-04 00:00:00 UTC									
source data			embed	code permalink info							



RPKI Filtering at IXPs

- Analysis by Job Snijders / Samer Abdel-Hafez / Marty Strong: <u>http://peering.exposed/</u>
- 9 out of top 10 IXPs already filtering
- Of all analysed IXPs: 68 filtering, 12 not filtering, 55 unknown
- Only 3 IXPs from ENOG region

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Recommendations

Create Your ROAs

- "my network becomes safer if you implement both signing and validation"
- Pay attention to the Max Length
- Download a Validator, or two
- Check validation status manually, which routes are invalid?
- Set up monitoring, for example pmacct

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Making the Difference

- Is routing security on your agenda?
- Are you leading by example?

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Initiate the conversation with providers and colleagues



Email address @Twitter handle

> What can we do better for you? Tell us and you could win an iPad!

www.ripe.net/survey







