

Anti Spoofing. Reboot.

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


IP Spoofing

- Attacks on TCP stack;
- TCP floods (SYN, ACK,...);
- Reflection Attacks;
- Amplification Attacks.

DDoS Amplifiers

Amplificators count




Source: [Qrator Labs annual report 2017](#)

BCP84: uRPF

<https://tools.ietf.org/html/bcp84>

- Strict mode;
- Feasible mode;
- Loose mode.



Strict Mode



| Provider | AS_PATH |
|----------|---------|
| A | X |
| B | X |
| C | A X |

Rule: incoming interface = interface for the **best** route for SRC_IP


Loose Mode



| Provider | AS_PATH |
|----------|---------|
| A | X |
| B | X |
| C | A X |

Rule: there is a route for SRC_IP


Feasible Mode



| Provider | AS_PATH |
|----------|---------|
| A | X |
| B | X |
| C | A X |

Rule: incoming interface = interface for the ~~best~~ route for SRC_IP

Feasible Mode



Rule: incoming interface = interface for the ~~best~~ route for SRC_IP

BCP84: uRPF

<https://tools.ietf.org/html/bcp84>

- Strict mode – not working;
- Loose mode – does nothing.
- Feasible mode – not working;

Problem Statement

A distance-vector protocol isn't the best way to propagate **availability** information.

Option №1: New SAFI

BGP Wars


NEW SAFI

The year 2118. The Emperor has finally finished its secret weapon and only cleared traffic with validated source IP addresses is travelling across the Galaxy. The DDoS attackers are all but extinct.

Hacking



Option №2: AS-SETS



| Provider | AS_PATH |
|----------|---------|
| A | X |
| B | X |
| C | A X |

Rule: Check that SRC_IP belongs to customer's AS_SET

Option №2: AS-SETs

Transformation of **ingress filters** into **ACLs**.


Positive:

- We do not need to change specification;
- We do not need to ship new software;
- Can be used by any ISP, **isn't it?**

Negative:


- AS-SETs are outdated, unauthorized;
- Scalability problems.

Option 3: GRSH + Feasible Mode




A new **transit** well-known community that sets LOCAL_PREF to 0.

Option 3: GRSH + Feasible Mode



Provider B sees x.x.x.0/24 route, but doesn't use it.
x.x.x.0/24 route marked with GRSH – **informational message**

Option 3: GRSH + Feasible Mode



Works only for multihomed ISPs...
But it more than 85% of all ISPs in the world!

Option 3: GRSH + Feasible Mode

GRACEFUL_SHTUTDOWN community creates **informational** message for **directly** connected peers.


Positive:

- We do not need to change specification;
- We do not need to ship new software;
- We solve problem for multihomed of ISPs.

Negative:

- A lot of work with customers is required;
- Doesn't work between transit ISPs.

Option 4: Do Nothing.



But are you prepared?

<http://etc.ch/kfR6/>



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