And now... BGPSec

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BGPsec Protocol Specification

RFC 8205



- RFC 8205: BGPsec Protocol Specification
- RFC 8206: BGPsec Considerations for Autonomous System (AS) Migration
- RFC 8207: BGPsec Operational Considerations
- RFC 8208: BGPsec Algorithms, Key Formats, and Signature Formats
- RFC 8209: A Profile for BGPsec Router Certificates, Certificate
 - Revocation Lists, and Certification Requests
- RFC 8210: The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router
- RFC 8211: Adverse Actions by a Certification Authority (CA) or Repository Manager in the Resource Public Key
 - Infrastructure (RPKI)


Origin Validation

Route Objects:

- Not in all RIRs;
- AS-SET can't be signed;
- Vulnerable to AS Path poisoning;

RPKI:

• Vulnerable to replay attacks.



Attacker prepends its path with victim's AS and... bypass any filters

BGPSec

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Target AS Number		
Signature Segment : N-1	\	
Secure_Path Segment : N		
	· (>	Data from N Segments
Signature Segment : 1		N Segments
Secure_Path Segment : 2		
Secure_Path Segment : 1	+ / /	
Algorithm Suite Identifier	+/	
+ AFI +	+	
SAFI	+	
+ NLRI	+	
T	т	

Every segment + Target AS are signed, not AS Path Poisoning!