# 319F2:80:119 30108:11095

# Resource Certification (RPKI)

Making BGP more secure

ENOG 5 – St. Petersburg



## The RIPE NCC involvement in RPKI

- The authority on who is the registered holder of an Internet Number Resource in our region
  - IPv4 and IPv6 Address Blocks
  - Autonomous System Numbers

Information is kept in the Registry

Accuracy and completeness are key

# Digital Resource Certificates

- Based on open IETF standards (sidr)
  - -RFC 5280: X.509 PKI Certificates
  - RFC 3779: Extensions for IP Addresses and ASNs
  - RFC 6481-6493: Resource Public Key Infrastructure
- Issued by the RIRs since 1 January 2011
- State that an Internet number resource has been registered by the RIPE NCC



# Digital Resource Certificates

- Resource Certification is a free, opt-in service
  - Your choice to request a certificate
    - Linked to registration
    - -Renewed every 12 months
- Enhancement to our Registry

Offers validatable proof of holdership

# Management: Your Choice

- Open Source Software to run a member CA
  - Use the RIPE NCC as parent CA (trust anchor)
  - Generate and publish Certificate yourself

- RIPE NCC Hosted Platform
  - All processes are secured and automated
  - One click set-up of Resource Certificate
  - WebUI to manage Certificates in LIR Portal

# 08.51.10014 33cb00313be3 319.F2:80:119 1:2209:6030 3008:1095

# Using RPKI for BGP Origin Validation



# Certification to Secure Internet Routing

 Members can use their resource certificate to make statements about their BGP Routing

> Route Origin Authorisation (ROA): "I authorise this Autonomous System to originate these IP prefixes"

- Also in the ROA: Maximum Prefix Length
  - The smallest prefix the ASN may announce

# Route Origin Authorisations

- A ROA affects the RPKI validity of a BGP route:
  - VALID: ROA found, authorised announcement
  - INVALID: ROA found, unauthorised announcement
  - UNKNOWN: No ROA found (resource not yet signed)

Every operator is free to base any routing decision on these three validity states



# Demo

Using the hosted system...



# 3008:1095

# Making routing decisions

using the RIPE NCC RPKI Validator




### Validation in Practice

- All certificates and ROAs are published in a repository and available for download
- Software running on your own machine will periodically retrieve and verify the information
  - Cryptographic tools check all the signatures
- The result is a list of all valid combinations of ASN and prefix, the "validated cache"

# The RIPE NCC RPKI Validator toolset


http://ripe.net/certification/tools-and-resources



- Requires Sun Java 1.6 and rsync
- No installation required
  - Unzip the package
  - -Run the program: ./bin/rpki-validator
- Web-interface available on localhost port 8080



# The RIPE NCC RPKI Validator toolset



# Demo

Using the RPKI Validator...



# RPKI support in routers

- The RPKI-RTR Protocol is an IETF Internet Draft
- Production Cisco Support:
  - -ASR1000, 7600, ASR903 and ASR901 in releases 15.2(1)S or XE 3.5
- Cisco Early Field Trial (EFT):
  - ASR9000, CRS1, CRS3 and c12K (IOS-XR)
- Juniper has support since version 12.2
- Quagga has support through BGP-SRX



# Router Configuration – Cisco

```
!
route-map rpki-loc-pref permit 10
  match rpki invalid
  set local-preference 90
!
route-map rpki-loc-pref permit 20
  match rpki not-found
  set local-preference 100
!
route-map rpki-loc-pref permit 30
  match rpki valid
  set local-preference 110
```

### Public Testbeds

- RIPE NCC has a Cisco:
  - Telnet to rpki-rtr.ripe.net
  - Username: ripe, no password
- Kaia Global Networks have a Juniper:
  - -Telnet to 193.34.50.25
  - Username: rpki, password: testbed

http://ripe.net/certification/router-configuration

# Information and Announcements

http://ripe.net/certification



#RPKI



# Questions?

- certification@ripe.net
- alexb@ripe.net
- @alexander\_band



