## DNS as a Defense Vector

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# **DNS** Itself

#### INTERNET AS A TERRITORY



#### But what is the internet?

- "It's the largest equivalence class in the reflexive transitive symmetric closure of the relationship *can be reached by an IP packet from.*"
   (Seth Breidbart)
- IP addresses, IP packets, underlie everything
- We overlay IP with many things, e.g., *the web* 
  - Most important overlay (for security) is: DNS

#### DNS AS A MAP



Most everything we do on the Internet...

- B2C Web, B2B Web, E-mail, I-M, <your idea here>
- ...relies on TCP/IP, and begins with a DNS lookup

Mobile Internet is dominated by search...

- ...but search itself relies extensively upon DNS

DNS has a rigorous internal structure

- Things that are in fact related, are related in DNS
- You can have *whois* privacy, but not DNS privacy

#### **CRIMINAL DNS**



The Internet has been a great accelerator of human civilization

- Inevitably, this includes human crime

Online crime is impossible without DNS

- Cheap throw-away domain names
- DNS registrars and servers in bad neighborhoods
- Whois privacy or simply bad whois data
- Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed.
  - (Francis Bacon)

### SO, ABOUT THAT INTERNAL STRUCTURE

Domain names are grouped into *zones* 

- Like root zone, or "COM", or "EXAMPLE.COM"

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A zone has one or more name servers

- Like "COM. NS a.gtld-servers.net."

Each name server has one or more addresses

- Like "a.gtld-servers.net. A 192.5.6.30"

S Other domain names also have addresses

- Like "www.apnic.net. A 203.119.102.244"

IP addresses are grouped into netblocks
 Like "192.5.6.0/24" or "203.119.102.240/28"

#### DNS SECURITY FEATURES



> TSIG secures heavy weight transactions


- Like UPDATE, IXFR/AXFR; but not QUERY
- DNSSEC secures data end-to-end
  - Zone is signed; responses contain signatures
  - Zone has keys; these are signed in parent zone
  - QUERY initiator can validate signatures
  - Requires universally trusted root signing key

Use TSIG and DNSSEC: they work, they'll help

- But: our actual topic today lies elsewhere

#### DNS DATA FLOW










## **DNS** as Abused

#### SPOOFED SOURCE ATTACK





#### DNS RESPONSE RATE LIMITING (RRL)



If you run a DNS content ("authority") server, it has to be massively overprovisioned

- Because OPN's don't have SAV, your server is a purpose-built DNS DDoS reflecting amplifier
- BIND, NSD, Knot now support DNS RRL, which accurately guesses what's safe to drop
- Your authority servers need this, whereas your recursive servers need to be firewalled off



### **RRL IN ACTION: AFILIAS**



#### "...TOO CHEAP TO METER"



SpamAssassin as a teaching tool

- For example: dotted quads in body as spamsign

RRP and EPP: solving "the .COM problem"

- Running a race to the bottom (cheaper; sooner)
- Quantity and fluidity having only one purpose
  - 30 seconds? Really?
- Fitting Sturgeon's revelation
  - "90% of <thing> is crap"

#### TAKEDOWN: FAR-END TRICKS

Since we can't prevent it...

- ...we'll have to evolve coping strategies

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> Takedown as a Service (TaaS?)

- Yes, you can outsource this now

A new profit center! (.TK)

- "Kill all you want, we'll make more!"

Whack-a-mole as a Service (WaaS?)

- Incrementalism breeds better criminals

#### FIREWALLS: NEAR-END TRICKS



If we can't prevent it and takedown is hard...

- ...then we'll have to fight them at our doorstep

We can filter IP+port, URL, and now even DNS

- But, bad guys are endlessly adaptive
- Ergo, so must we be

We can't afford manual configuration

- So, firewall config now follows a pub-sub model

#### DNS FIREWALLS WITH RPZ



S Uses DNS zones to carry DNS Firewall policy

– R-P-Z = Response Policy Zones

Pub-sub is handled by NOTIFY/TSIG/IXFR

- Many publishers, many subscribers, one format
- Subscribe to multiple external feeds
  - And create your own, for local policy reasons

Simple failure or walled garden, as you choose

- We call this "taking back the DNS"

#### **RPZ CAPABILITIES**



- If the query name is \$X
- If the response contains an address in CIDR \$X
- If any NS name is \$X
- If any NS address is in CIDR \$X
- If the query source address is in CIDR \$X

- Actions (RR data):
  - Synthesize NXDOMAIN

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- Synthesize CNAME
- Synthesize NODATA
- Synthesize an answer
- Answer with the truth

#### WHY USE RPZ?



#### Easy stuff:

- Block access to DGA C&C's
- Block access to known phish/driveby
- Block e-mail if envelope/header is spammy

More interesting stuff:

- Block DNS A/AAAA records in bad address space
  - E.g., import Cymru Bogons or Spamhaus DROP list
- Block domains having some computable attribute
  - E.g., Farsight Newly Observed Domains (NOD) list

#### **KEY RPZ TAKEAWAYS**



#### Implications:

- Open market for producers and consumers
- Differentiated service at a global scale
- Instantaneous wide area takedown

#### Deployment:

- The RPZ standard is open and unencumbered
- So far implemented in BIND, Unbound, PowerDNS
- BIND RPZ performance is not unreasonable (~5% QPS loss)
- New RPZ features will be backward compatible
- RPZ is not an IETF standard






# **DNS** as Observed

#### PASSIVE DNS DATAFLOW





#### OWNER LOOKUP, SHOW HISTORY

\$ dnsdb\_query -r vix.com/ns/vix.com

- ;; record times: 2010-07-04 16:14:12 \ .. 2013-05-12 00:55:59
- ;; count: 2221563; bailiwick: vix.com.
- vix.com. NS ns.sql1.vix.com.
- vix.com. NS ns1.isc-sns.net.
- vix.com. NS ns2.isc-sns.com.
- vix.com. NS ns3.isc-sns.info.
- vix.com. NS buy.internettraffic.com.
- vix.com. NS sell.internettraffic.com.

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#### OWNER WILDCARDS (LEFT OR RIGHT SIDE)



<pre>\$ dnsdb query -r \*.vix.com</pre>	ı/a	fgrep 24.104.150
internal.cat.lah1.vix.com.	, а А	24.104.150.1
ss.vix.com.	A	24.104.150.2
SS.VIX.COM.	А	
gutentag.vix.com.	Α	24.104.150.3
lah1z.vix.com.	А	24.104.150.4
mm.vix.com.	А	24.104.150.11
ww.vix.com.	А	24.104.150.12
<pre>external.cat.lah1.vix.com.</pre>	А	24.104.150.33
<pre>wireless.cat.lah1.vix.com.</pre>	А	24.104.150.65
wireless.ss.vix.com.	А	24.104.150.66
ap-kit.lah1.vix.com.	А	24.104.150.67
cat.lah1.vix.com.	А	24.104.150.225
vix.com.	А	24.104.150.231
deadrat.lah1.vix.com.	А	24.104.150.232
ns-maps.vix.com.	А	24.104.150.232
ns.lah1.vix.com.	А	24.104.150.234

### DATA LOOKUP, BY NAME

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\$ ./dnsdb_query -n ss.vix.su/mx						
vix.su.	MX	10	ss.vix.su.			
dns-ok.us.	MX	0	ss.vix.su.			
mibh.com.	MX	0	ss.vix.su.			
iengines.com.	MX	0	ss.vix.su.			
toomanydatsuns.com.	MX	0	ss.vix.su.			
farsightsecurity.com.	MX	10	ss.vix.su.			
anog.net.	MX	0	ss.vix.su.			
mibh.net.	MX	0	ss.vix.su.			
tisf.net.	MX	10	ss.vix.su.			
iengines.net.	MX	0	ss.vix.su.			
al.org.	MX	0	ss.vix.su.			
vixie.org.	MX	0	ss.vix.su.			
redbarn.org.	MX	0	ss.vix.su.			
<pre>benedelman.org.</pre>	MX	0	ss.vix.su.			

#### DATA LOOKUP, BY IP ADDRESS

\$ dnsdb\_query -r ic.fbi.gov/mx ic.fbi.gov. MX 10 mail.ic.fbi.gov.

\$ dnsdb\_query -r mail.ic.fbi.gov/a
mail.ic.fbi.gov. A 153.31.119.142

\$ dnsdb\_query -i 153.31.119.142 ic.fbi.gov. A 153.31.119.142 mail.ic.fbi.gov. A 153.31.119.142 mail.ncijtf.fbi.gov. A 153.31.119.142



#### DATA LOOKUP, BY IP ADDRESS BLOCK



\$ dnsdb_query -i 153.31.119.	.0/2	24   grep -v infragard
<pre>vpn.dev2.leo.gov.</pre>	Α	153.31.119.70
mail.leo.gov.	Α	153.31.119.132
www.biometriccoe.gov.	А	153.31.119.135
www.leo.gov.	Α	153.31.119.136
cgate.leo.gov.	Α	153.31.119.136
www.infraguard.net.	Α	153.31.119.138
infraguard.org.	Α	153.31.119.138
www.infraguard.org.	Α	153.31.119.138
mx.leo.gov.	Α	153.31.119.140
ic.fbi.gov.	А	153.31.119.142
mail.ic.fbi.gov.	Α	153.31.119.142
<pre>mail.ncijtf.fbi.gov.</pre>	Α	153.31.119.142



These slides show a DNS output conversion
 The real output is in JSON format, i.e.:

```
$ dnsdb_query -r f.root-servers.net/a/root-servers.net
;; record times: 2010-06-24 03:10:38 .. 2014-03-05 01:22:56
;; count: 715301521; bailiwick: root-servers.net.
f.root-servers.net. A 192.5.5.241
```

\$ dnsdb\_query -r f.root-servers.net/a/root-servers.net -j
{"count": 715301521, "time\_first": 1277349038, "rrtype": "A",
"rrname": "f.root-servers.net.", "bailiwick": "rootservers.net.", "rdata": ["192.5.5.241"], "time\_last": 1393982576}

#### DNSDB DEPLOYMENT NOTES

FSI Passive DNS sensor is open source (PCAP)

- 'dnstap' is coming soon, for server embedding

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> The FSI DNSDB API is open (now an IETF I-D)

- FSI, 360.CN, NIC.AT, &others have servers

> FSI DNSDB is quasi-commercial:

- Full grant for students (with advisor's approval)
- Partial grant for those who operate sensors for us
- Commercially available for use, resale, embedding

#### LIMITED BIBLIOGRAPHY



https://www.farsightsecurity.com/

http://www.redbarn.org/dns/ratelimits

http://dnsrpz.info/

https://dnsdb.info/

https://dnstap.info/

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