#### **BGP** Roles

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# BGP Policy is made by...

- Local Pref
- Prepends
- RPSL
- RPKI
- Communities

And other XX config options

Ha! Easy! Love flexibility!

### But is it simple?

# 140 RFC have already been written!388 RFC drafts

Numerous BCPs...

KISS is not for BGP?

#### It could be quite simple...


protocol bgp IAMOPERATOR {
 local as MY\_AS;
 neighbor X.X.X as AS\_PROVIDER;

### The Great Gap

#### Expectation


#### **BGP** Configuration






### A Simple Result


#### A simple route leak!



#### Route Leak: stats




#### Who is the *leaker*?




About ~1000 leakers affect... Everybody!

#### Newcomers



### Imagine yourself on a highway...





bgpbusters! Are you afraid of leaks?

#### **Option 2: A new BGP extension**




# **Avoiding Route Leaks**

Optional non-transit attribute – Internal Only To Customer Attribute (iOTC):

- Flag is not set announce in all directions
- Flag is set announce **only** to internal and customer links

# **Preventing Route Leaks**




If route was learned from a provider or peer it should not be announced to another provider or peer

### **Detecting Route Leaks**

Optional transit attribute – External Only To Customer Attribute (eOTC):

- Attribute is not set no info
- Attribute is set and equals to neighbor AS ok
- Otherwise route leak

### **Detecting Route Leaks**



If route was learned from a customer or peer and eOTC is set and eOTC != neighbor AS then route was leaked

#### What should we do with Route Leak?



# Security Considerations: eOTC

#### Mistake/violation in eOTC flag



It could have significantly impact on route propagation

#### Local Preference Values

Preset values:

- From customer (+\$) links: 300;
- From peer (0\$) links: 200;
- From provider (-\$) links: 100;
- Route Leaks (-\$\$\$) links: 0.

#### **Route Leak Mitigation**

- iOTC route leak prevention
- eOTC route leak detection


#### BINGO?

#### Meet The Neighbor Role

4 Roles: customer, provider, peer, internal


nitradir@ubuntu:~/workspace/hll/bird\$ ./bird -p -c bird.conf pird: bird.conf, line 11: Role must be set for each BGP protocol nitradir@ubuntu:~/workspace/hll/bird\$

# Meet The Neighbor Role



#### 3 pairs of non-conflict roles:

- 1. Peer <---> Peer
- 2. Customer <---> Provider
- 3. Internal <---> Internal



# **Notification** if the role is not set in OPEN from the neighbor

### **Route Leak Mitigation**

- iOTC route leak prevention
- eOTC route leak detection
- Roles controlling both attributes
- Roles controlled by neighbors

BINGO!

### A Simple Config

protocol bgp IAMOPERATOR {
 local as MY\_AS;
 neighbor X.X.X.X as AS\_PROVIDER;
 role client;

# Benefits

Backward compatibility

- Unknown optional non-transit attributes are just ignored
- Unknown capabilities should be just ignored!
  Route leak extinction:
- No mistake leaks

Roles:

- Opportunity to control neighbor configuration
- And a set of other applications

#### Future Work

- Roles as AS boundaries
  - Keep non-transit attributes between internal BGP sessions
  - external > internal in BGP decision process
- Roles as preset Local Preference Values
- Roles in anti-spoofing

# Useful Links

Overview of protocol change:

radar.qrator.net/tools/simple-bgp/

Fork of BIRD routing daemon:

github.com/QratorLabs/bird/

IETF draft:

tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ymbk-idr-bgp-openpolicy-00

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