

# DANE/DNSSEC/TLS Testing in the Go6lab

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# Acknowledgement

I would like to thank Internet Society to let me spend some of my ISOC working time in go6lab and test all this new and exciting protocols and mechanisms that makes Internet a bit better and more secure place...




# DNSSEC implementation in go6lab

- Powerdns server (used as primary for non-signed domains) as “hidden” primary DNS server
- OpenDNSSEC platform for signing domains
- BIND9 DNS servers as secondaries to OpenDNSSEC to serve signed zones
- Virtualization used: PROXMOX 3.4
- OS templates: fedora-20, Centos6/7

# DNSSEC implementation in go6lab

- “Bump in a wire”
- Two public “primary” servers
- Concept:



# DNSSEC in go6lab

- That was fairly easy and it works very well.
- Implementation document used from Matthijs Mekking:

<http://go6.si/docs/opendnssec-start-guide-draft.pdf>

# DANE experiment

- When DNSSEC was set up and functioning we started to experiment with DANE (DNS Authenticated Name Entities).
- Requirements:
  - DNSSEC signed domains
  - Postfix server with TLS support > 2.11
- We decided on Postfix 3.0.1

# DANE

- TLSA record for mx.go6lab.si


```
_25._tcp.mx.go6lab.si. IN  TLSA  3 0 1  
B4B7A46F9F0DFEA0151C2E07A5AD7908F4C8B0050E7CC  
25908DA05E2 A84748ED
```

It's basically a hash of TLS certificate on mx.go6lab.si

More about DANE:


<http://www.internetsociety.org/deploy360/resources/dane/>

# TLS and SMTP





# TLS and SMTP



# TLS and SMTP



# DANE verification

- Mx.go6lab.si was able to verify TLS cert to T-2 mail server and nlnet-labs and some others...

mx postfix/smtp[31332]: Verified TLS connection established to smtp-good-in-2.t-2.si[2a01:260:1:4::24]:25: TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)

dicht postfix/smtp[29540]: Verified TLS connection established to mx.go6lab.si[2001:67c:27e4::23]:25: TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)

# Postfix config

```
smtpd_use_tls = yes
smtpd_tls_security_level = may
smtpd_tls_key_file = /etc/postfix/ssl/server.pem
smtpd_tls_cert_file = /etc/postfix/ssl/server.pem
smtpd_tls_auth_only = no
smtpd_tls_loglevel = 1
smtpd_tls_received_header = yes
smtpd_tls_session_cache_timeout = 3600s
smtp_tls_security_level = dane
smtp_use_tls = yes
smtp_tls_note_starttls_offer = yes
smtp_tls_loglevel = 1
tls_random_exchange_name = /var/run/prng_exch
tls_random_source = dev:/dev/urandom
tls_smtp_use_tls = yes
```

# Malformed TLSA record

- We created a TLSA record with a bad hash (one character changed)
- Postfix failed to verify it and refused to send a message

```
mx postfix/smtp[1765]: Untrusted TLS connection established to  
mail-bad.go6lab.si[2001:67c:27e4::beee]:25: TLSv1.2 with  
cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)  
mx postfix/smtp[1765]: 3A4BE8EE5C: Server certificate not  
trusted
```

# 1M top Alexa domains and DANE

- We fetched top 1 million Alexa domains and created a script that sent an email to each of them ( test-dnssec-dane@[domain] )
- After some tweaking of the script we got some good results
- Then we built a script that parsed mail log file and here are the results:

# Results

- Out of 1 million domains, 992,232 of them had MX record and mail server.
- Nearly 70% (687,897) of all attempted SMTP sessions to Alexa top 1 million domains MX records were encrypted with TLS
- Majority of TLS connections (60%) were established with trusted certificate
- 1,382 connections where remote mail server announced TLS capability failed with "Cannot start TLS: handshake failure"

# More results

TLS established connections ratios are:

Anonymous: 109.753

Untrusted: 167.063

Trusted: 410.953

Verified: 128

Quick guide: Anonymous (opportunistic TLS with no signature), Untrusted (peer certificate not signed by trusted CA), Trusted (peer certificate signed by trusted CA) and Verified (verified with TLSA by DANE).



# DANE Verified

Verified: 128 !!!

# Mail distribution

Mail Servers	# Domains Handled	TLS State
google.com	125,422	Trusted
secureserver.net	35,759	Some Trusted, some no TLS at all
qq.com	11,254	No TLS
Yandex.ru	9,268	Trusted
Ovh.net	8,531	Most Trusted, with redirect servers having no TLS at all

# Mail distribution

Mail Servers	# Domains Handled	TLS State
Emailsrvr.com	8,262	Trusted
Zohomail.com	2.981	Trusted
Lolipop.jp	1.685	No TLS
Kundenserver.de	2,834	Trusted
Gandi.net	2,200	Anonymous

# DNSSEC? DANE?

None of these “big” mail servers (and their domains) are DNSSEC signed (that means no DANE for them possible).

# When do DANE things fail?

- Of course, with wrong certificate hash in TLSA record (refuses to send mail)
- If domain where MX record resides is not DNSSEC signed (can't trust the data in MX, so no verification)
- If TLSA record published in non-DNSSEC zone (can't trust the data in TLSA, so no verification)

# When do things fail? (example)

- go6lab.si zone is signed, so is mx.go6lab.si
- there is TLSA for mx.go6lab.si, also signed
- Domain signed.si is signed and MX points to mx.go6lab.si
- Domain not-signed.si is not signed and MX points to mx.go6lab.si
- We send email to [jan@signed.si](mailto:jan@signed.si) and [jan@not-signed.si](mailto:jan@not-signed.si) (signed.si and not-signed.si are used just as examples)

# When do things fail? (example)

When I send email to [jan@signed.si](mailto:jan@signed.si) (signed domain):

**Verified** TLS connection established to  
mx.go6lab.si[2001:67c:27e4::23]:25:

When I send email to [jan@not-signed.si](mailto:jan@not-signed.si) (not signed domain):

**Anonymous** TLS connection established to  
mx.go6lab.si[2001:67c:27e4::23]:25:

# When do DANE verification also fail?

- Let's try to point MX record from signed domain to A/AAAA record in not-signed domain with TLSA that is also not signed (obviously) – mail.not-signed.si

Send mail to [jan@signed.si](mailto:jan@signed.si) when MX for [signed.si](#) points to [mail.not-signed.si](#) – DANE verification is not even started as chain of trust is broken



# When do DANE verification also fail?

- Let's try to point MX record from signed domain to A/AAAA record in not-signed domain with **malformed** TLSA that is also not signed (obviously) – mail.not-signed.si

Send mail to [jan@signed.si](mailto:jan@signed.si) when MX for [signed.si](#) points to [mail-bad.not-signed.si](#) – DANE verification is not even started as chain of trust is broken and even if there is TLSA record with a hash that does not match the offered TLS cert hash – mail is sent anyway.

# Conclusions

- 70% of email can be encrypted in some way, you just need to enable TLS on your server
- Low number of DNSSEC signed domains/servers
- Even lower number of DANE/TLSA verified servers/connections
- It's easy, go and do it – it's not the end of the world and it helps with verifying who are you sending emails to – and vice versa ;)

# Conclusions II.

- DANE verification fails (or is aborted) if DNSSEC chain of trust is not fully established and complete along the whole way.
- TLSA in not-signed DNS zones would not help you much preventing your correspondents sending emails to server-in-the-middle
- DNSSEC/DANE is easy, but please understand what are you doing before implementing it in production...

# Q&A

Questions? Protests? Suggestions?  
Complaints?

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