




Certificate transparency: New part of PKI infrastructure

A presentation by Dmitry Belyavsky, TCI


ENOG 7


Moscow, May 26-27, 2014



*) **PKI (public-key infrastructure)** is a set of hardware, software, people, policies, and procedures needed to create, manage, distribute, use, store, and revoke digital certificates

Check the server certificate





OCSF requests for the fake *.google.com certificate

Source: FOX-IT, Interim Report, <http://cryptome.org/0005/diginotar-insec.pdf>



PKI



**Independent
source**



**Trusted
certificate**

DANE (RFC 6698)

Limited browsers support

Certificate pinning

Mozilla Certificate Patrol,
Chrome cache for Google certificates

Certificate transparency (RFC 6962)

Inspired by Google (Support in Chrome appeared)
One of the authors - Ben Laurie (OpenSSL Founder)
CA support – Comodo



- Log accepts cert => SCT

Client

- Is SCT present and signed correctly?

Client


- Is SCT present and signed correctly?

Auditor


- Does log server behave correctly?

Monitor


- Any suspicious certs?




Current TLS/SSL System



TLS/SSL System with
Certificate Transparency
(X.509v3 Extension)




- Existing TLS/SSL system
- Supplemental CT components
- One-time operations
- Synchronous operations






Google Chrome Support (33+)



<http://www.certificate-transparency.org/certificate-transparency-in-chrome>

Google Cert EV plan

<http://www.certificate-transparency.org/ev-ct-plan>



Open source code

2 pilot logs



SAVE from MITM attack

- ✓ **Warning from browser**
- ✓ **Site owner can watch logs for certs**

**Do NOT SAVE from
HEARTBLEED!**



**Russian GOST does not save
from the MITM attack**

Algorithm

SHA-256 >>> GOSTR34.11-2012

Key

>>> GOST R 34.10-2012



Questions?

Drop 'em at:

beldmit@tcinet.ru