

# Resource Certification (RPKI)

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# The RIPE NCC involvement in RPKI

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- The authority on who is the registered holder of an Internet Number Resource in our region
  - IPv4 and IPv6 Address Blocks
  - Autonomous System Numbers
- Information is kept in the Registry
- Accuracy and completeness are key

# Digital Resource Certificates

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- Resource Certification is a free, opt-in service
  - Your choice to request a certificate
    - Linked to registration
    - Renewed every 12 months
- Certificate does not list any identity information



# Certificate Authority (CA) Structure

Root CA (RIPE NCC)



Member CA (LIR)



Customer CA



# Applications for Certificates

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BGP Origin Validation



# Management: Your Choice

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- Open Source Software to run a member CA
  - Use the RIPE NCC as parent CA (trust anchor)
  - Generate and publish Certificate yourself
- RIPE NCC Hosted Platform
  - All processes are secured and automated
  - One click set-up of Resource Certificate
  - WebUI to manage Certificates in LIR Portal

# Certification to Secure Internet Routing

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- Members can use their resource certificate to make statements about their BGP Routing

Route Origin Authorisation (ROA):

*“I authorise this Autonomous System to originate these IP prefixes”*

- Other network operators can set their routing preferences based on this information

# Route Origin Authorisations

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- Only the registered holder of a Internet number resource can create a valid ROA
- A ROA affects the RPKI validity of a route announcement:
  - VALID: ROA found, authorised announcement
  - INVALID: ROA found, unauthorised announcement
  - UNKNOWN: No ROA found (resource not yet signed)



# ROA Creation

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Demo

## ROA Specifications

Route Origination Authorisation (ROA) objects authorise Autonomous Systems to route your IP address resources.

On this page you can specify which Autonomous Systems you authorise to route your IP address resources. The system will then automatically publish the appropriate ROA objects.

Name	AS number	Prefixes	Not valid before	Not valid after	ROA object
invalid-ipv4	AS196615	93.175.147.0/24			<a href="#">View »</a> <a href="#">Edit</a> <a href="#">Delete</a>
invalid-ipv6	AS196615	2001:7fb:fd03::/48			<a href="#">View »</a> <a href="#">Edit</a> <a href="#">Delete</a>
valid-ipv4	AS12654	93.175.146.0/24			<a href="#">View »</a> <a href="#">Edit</a> <a href="#">Delete</a>
valid-ipv6	AS12654	2001:7fb:fd02::/48			<a href="#">View »</a> <a href="#">Edit</a> <a href="#">Delete</a>

[Add ROA Specification »](#)

## ROA Specification

ROA specifications are used by the system to automatically publish the required ROA objects. See below for an explanation of the fields used to specify your ROA objects:

85.118.184/22





✖

Maximum length

Not valid before

and/or after

### My certified resources

85.118.184/21
93.175.146/23

2001:7fb:fd02::/47

**Name:** A unique name for use within your organisation. The name is not visible to anyone else.

**ASN:** The number of the Autonomous System that you authorise to route the listed resources.

**Prefix:** The IPv4 or IPv6 prefix to authorise.

**Maximum Length:** When not present, the Autonomous System is only authorised to advertise exactly the prefix specified here. When present, this specifies the length of the most specific IP prefix that the Autonomous System is authorised to advertise. For example, if the IP address prefix is 10.0/16 and the maximum length is 24, the Autonomous System is authorised to advertise any prefix under 10.0/16, as long as it is no more specific than /24. So in this example, the Autonomous System would be authorised to advertise 10.0/16, 10.0.128/20, or 10.0.255/24, but not 10.0.255.0/25.

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# Data Quality and Integrity

- Use RIS Route Collectors to support Certification
  - Show the RPKI validity state of a route announcement
  - Trigger alert when ROAs mismatch BGP

**Current BGP announcements**

These are the current BGP announcements, as seen by the RIPE NCC Remote Route Collectors, that overlap with your certified resources. Only announcements seen by five or more peers are shown. This data can be up to nine hours old, so recent changes might not be reflected.

Search:

Origin AS	▲ Prefix	◆ Route Validity	◆
AS12654	93.175.146.0/24	VALID	
AS12654	93.175.147.0/24	INVALID	
AS12654	2001:7fb:fd02::/48	VALID	
AS12654	2001:7fb:fd03::/48	INVALID	


# Publication of cryptographic objects

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- Publication is distributed by design
  - Publish yourself or publish through a 3rd party
- Each RIR has a public repository
  - Holds Certificates, ROAs, etc.
  - Refreshed at least every 24 hrs
- Accessed using a Validation tool
  - Communication via rsync
  - Builds up a local validated cache



# Resource Certification Adoption



# RIPE NCC RPKI Validation tool

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# RIPE NCC RPKI-RTR Validator

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- Web-based user interface
- Periodically validates all ROA repositories
  - Downloads and processes changes automatically
- Ignore Filters (Apply RPKI status ‘Unknown’)
- Whitelist (Apply RPKI status ‘Valid’)
- RPKI-Router Support
  - Cisco, Juniper, Quagga...

Open source, BSD License

# RIPE NCC RPKI-RTR Validator

The screenshot shows a web browser window titled "RPKI Validator - Quick overview of BGP Origin validation". The navigation bar includes "RPKI Validator", "Home", "Trust Anchors", "ROAs", "Filters", "Whitelist", "BGP Preview", and "rpkirtr log". The main heading is "Quick overview of BGP Origin validation". Below it is a flowchart with five boxes: "Trust Anchors" (highlighted in blue), "ROAs", "Ignore Filters", "Whitelist", and "Router". Arrows indicate a flow from Trust Anchors to ROAs, ROAs to Ignore Filters, Ignore Filters to Whitelist, and Whitelist to Router. A text box below the flowchart explains that Trust Anchors are entry points for validation in any PKI system and that the validator is pre-configured for four RIRs. A "Feedback" button is visible on the left side of the browser window.

RPKI Validator - Quick overview of BGP Origin validation

RPKI Validator Home Trust Anchors ROAs Filters Whitelist BGP Preview rpkirtr log

## Quick overview of BGP Origin validation

Trust Anchors ROAs Ignore Filters Whitelist Router

Trust Anchors are the entry points used for validation in any Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) system. This validator is intended for the validation of Resource PKI (RPKI) systems. It is pre-configured with Trust Anchors for four RIRs who are running such systems now.

Feedback

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# RIPE NCC RPKI Validator 2.3

RPKI Validator – BGP Preview

RPKI Validator Home Trust Anchors ROAs Ignore Filters Whitelist **BGP Preview** Export Router Sessions rpkirtr log


Show 10 entries Search: 85/8

ASN	Prefix	Validity
20597	85.249.224.0/19	VALID
20597	85.249.8.0/21	VALID
35063	85.237.160.0/19	VALID
15456	85.236.32.0/19	VALID
13110	85.221.128.0/17	VALID
6714	85.219.128.0/17	VALID
6724	85.214.0.0/15	VALID
34619	85.159.71.0/24	VALID
34619	85.159.70.0/24	VALID
34619	85.159.69.0/24	VALID

Feedback

First Previous **1** 2 3 4 5 Next Last

Showing 1 to 10 of 2,696 entries (filtered from 418,780 total entries)

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# RPKI support in routers

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- The RPKI-RTR Protocol is an IETF standard
- Production Cisco Support:
  - ASR1000, 7600, ASR903 and ASR901  
in releases 15.2(1)S or XE 3.5
- Cisco Early Field Trial (EFT):
  - ASR9000, CRS1, CRS3 and c12K (IOS-XR)
- Juniper planning support in 12.2 (Q3 2012)
- Quagga has support through BGP-SRX

# Router Configuration – Cisco

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```
!  
route-map rpki-loc-pref permit 10  
  match rpki invalid  
  set local-preference 90  
!  
route-map rpki-loc-pref permit 20  
  match rpki not-found  
  set local-preference 100  
!  
route-map rpki-loc-pref permit 30  
  match rpki valid  
  set local-preference 110
```

# Public Testbeds

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- RIPE NCC has a Cisco:
  - Telnet to `rpki-rtr.ripe.net`
  - Username: `ripe`, no password
- Netsign has a Juniper:
  - Telnet to `juniper.rpki.netsign.net`
  - Username: `rpki`, password: `testbed`
- <http://ripe.net/certification/router-configuration>

# RPKI Webinars

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NEW

- One hour online session
- Theory and practical examples
- Live interaction
- Next session 5 June 2012
- Sign up now:

[ripe.net/training/e-learning/webinars](http://ripe.net/training/e-learning/webinars)

# Information and Announcements

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<http://ripe.net/certification>

 #RPKI





# Questions?

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