

Resource Certification (RPKI)

Alex Band – Product Manager



The RIPE NCC involvement in RPKI

- The authority on who is the registered holder of an Internet Number Resource in our region
 - IPv4 and IPv6 Address Blocks
 - Autonomous System Numbers
- Information is kept in the Registry
- Accuracy and completeness are key

Digital Resource Certificates

- Based on open IETF standards (sidr)
 - RFC 5280: X.509 PKI Certificates
 - RFC 3779: Extensions for IP Addresses and ASNs
- Issued by the RIRs
- State that an Internet number resource has been registered by the RIPE NCC

Digital Resource Certificates

- Resource Certification is a free, opt-in service
 - Your choice to request a certificate
 - Linked to registration
 - Renewed every 12 months
- Certificate does not list any identity information



Certificate Authority (CA) Structure


Root CA (RIPE NCC)



Member CA (LIR)



Customer CA



Applications for Certificates

Applications for Resource Certificates

- Make the Registry more robust
 - Offer validatable proof of holdership
- Secure and legitimise resource transfers
- Aid in securing Internet routing
 - BGP origin validation now
 - BGP path validation in the future
- System does not create additional powers for the RIRs



Management: Your Choice

- Open Source Software to run a member CA
 - Use the RIPE NCC as parent CA (trust anchor)
 - Generate and publish Certificate yourself
- RIPE NCC Hosted Platform
 - All processes are secured and automated
 - One click set-up of Resource Certificate
 - WebUI to manage Certificates in LIR Portal

Certification to Secure Internet Routing

- Members can use their resource certificate to make statements about their BGP Routing

Route Origin Authorisation (ROA):

“I authorise this Autonomous System to originate these IP prefixes”

- Other network operators can set their routing preferences based on this information

Route Origin Authorisations

- Only the registered holder of a Internet number resource can create a valid ROA
- A ROA affects the RPKI validity of a route announcement:
 - VALID: ROA found, authorised announcement
 - INVALID: ROA found, unauthorised announcement
 - UNKNOWN: No ROA found (resource not yet signed)

ROA Creation

Demo

ROA Specifications

Route Origination Authorisation (ROA) objects authorise Autonomous Systems to route your IP address resources.

On this page you can specify which Autonomous Systems you authorise to route your IP address resources. The system will then automatically publish the appropriate ROA objects.

Name	AS number	Prefixes	Not valid before	Not valid after	ROA object
invalid-ipv4	AS196615	93.175.147.0/24			View » Edit Delete
invalid-ipv6	AS196615	2001:7fb:fd03::/48			View » Edit Delete
valid-ipv4	AS12654	93.175.146.0/24			View » Edit Delete
valid-ipv6	AS12654	2001:7fb:fd02::/48			View » Edit Delete

[Add ROA Specification »](#)

ROA Specification

ROA specifications are used by the system to automatically publish the required ROA objects. See below for an explanation of the fields used to specify your ROA objects:

85.118.184/22

✖

Maximum length

Not valid before

and/or after

My certified resources

85.118.184/21

93.175.146/23

2001:7fb:fd02::/47

Name: A unique name for use within your organisation. The name is not visible to anyone else.

ASN: The number of the Autonomous System that you authorise to route the listed resources.

Prefix: The IPv4 or IPv6 prefix to authorise.

Maximum Length: When not present, the Autonomous System is only authorised to advertise exactly the prefix specified here. When present, this specifies the length of the most specific IP prefix that the Autonomous System is authorised to advertise. For example, if the IP address prefix is 10.0/16 and the maximum length is 24, the Autonomous System is authorised to advertise any prefix under 10.0/16, as long as it is no more specific than /24. So in this example, the Autonomous System would be authorised to advertise 10.0/16, 10.0.128/20, or 10.0.255/24, but not 10.0.255.0/25.

ROA Specification

ROA specifications are used by the system to automatically publish the required ROA objects. See below for an explanation of the fields used to specify your ROA objects:

AS64511

*

My upstream AS

85.118.184/22

|< 24

2001:7fb:fd02::/47

|<

Not valid before

Add ROA

My certified resources

Search

85.118.184/21

93.175.146/23

2001:7fb:fd02::/47

Name: A unique name for use within your organisation. The name is not visible to anyone else.

ASN: The number of the Autonomous System that you authorise to route the listed resources.

Prefix: The IPv4 or IPv6 prefix to authorise.

Maximum Length: When not present, the Autonomous System is only authorised to advertise exactly the prefix specified here. When present, this specifies the length of the most specific IP prefix that the Autonomous System is authorised to advertise. For example, if the IP address prefix is 10.0/16 and the maximum length is 24, the Autonomous System is authorised to advertise any prefix under 10.0/16, as long as it is no more specific than /24. So in this example, the Autonomous System would be authorised to advertise 10.0/16, 10.0.128/20, or 10.0.255/24, but not 10.0.255.0/25.

Data Quality and Integrity

- Use RIS Route Collectors to support Certification
 - Show the RPKI validity state of a route announcement
 - Trigger alert when ROAs mismatch BGP

Current BGP announcements

These are the current BGP announcements, as seen by the RIPE NCC Remote Route Collectors, that overlap with your certified resources. Only announcements seen by five or more peers are shown. This data can be up to nine hours old, so recent changes might not be reflected.

Search:

Origin AS	Prefix	Route Validity
AS12654	93.175.146.0/24	VALID
AS12654	93.175.147.0/24	INVALID
AS12654	2001:7fb:fd02::/48	VALID
AS12654	2001:7fb:fd03::/48	INVALID


Publication of cryptographic objects

- Publication is distributed by design
 - Publish yourself or publish through a 3rd party
- Each RIR has a public repository
 - Holds Certificates, ROAs, etc.
 - Refreshed at least every 24 hrs
- Accessed using a Validation tool
 - Communication via rsync
 - Builds up a local validated cache




Adoption

Number of certificates issued



Adoption

Number of ROAs created by members



RIPE NCC RPKI Validation tool

RIPE NCC RPKI-RTR Validator

- Web-based user interface
- Periodically validates all ROA repositories
 - Downloads and processes changes automatically
- Ignore Filters (Apply RPKI status ‘Unknown’)
- Whitelist (Apply RPKI status ‘Valid’)
- RPKI-Router Support
 - Cisco, Juniper, Quagga...

Open source, BSD License

RIPE NCC RPKI-RTR Validator

The screenshot shows a web browser window titled "RPKI Validator - Quick overview of BGP Origin validation". The navigation bar includes "RPKI Validator", "Home", "Trust Anchors", "ROAs", "Filters", "Whitelist", "BGP Preview", and "rpkirtr log". The main heading is "Quick overview of BGP Origin validation". Below it is a flowchart with five boxes: "Trust Anchors" (highlighted in light blue), "ROAs", "Ignore Filters", "Whitelist", and "Router". Arrows indicate a sequential flow from left to right. A "Feedback" button is visible on the left side of the page. A text box below the flowchart explains that Trust Anchors are entry points for validation in any PKI system and that the validator is pre-configured for four RIRs. The footer contains copyright information for RIPE NCC from 2009 to 2011.

RPKI Validator - Quick overview of BGP Origin validation

RPKI Validator Home Trust Anchors ROAs Filters Whitelist BGP Preview rpkirtr log

Quick overview of BGP Origin validation

Trust Anchors ROAs Ignore Filters Whitelist Router

Trust Anchors are the entry points used for validation in any Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) system. This validator is intended for the validation of Resource PKI (RPKI) systems. It is pre-configured with Trust Anchors for four RIRs who are running such systems now.

Feedback

Copyright © 2009, 2010, 2011 the Réseaux IP Européens Network Coordination Centre RIPE NCC. All rights restricted.

RIPE NCC RPKI-RTR Validator

RPKI Validator – Quick overview of BGP Origin validation

RPKI Validator Home Trust Anchors **ROAs** Filters Whitelist BGP Preview rpk-rtr log

Validated ROAs

Validated ROAs from APNIC RPKI Root, AfriNIC RPKI Root, LACNIC RPKI Root, RIPE NCC RPKI Root.

[Download validated ROAs as CSV](#)

Show entries Search:

ASN	Prefix	Maximum Length	Trust Anchor
1126	85.90.64.0/19	19	RIPE NCC RPKI Root
3303	85.0.0.0/13	24	RIPE NCC RPKI Root
6714	85.219.128.0/17	17	RIPE NCC RPKI Root
6724	85.214.0.0/15	16	RIPE NCC RPKI Root
9146	85.92.224.0/19	21	RIPE NCC RPKI Root
13110	85.221.128.0/17	24	RIPE NCC RPKI Root
13301	85.14.192.0/18	24	RIPE NCC RPKI Root
15456	85.236.32.0/19	19	RIPE NCC RPKI Root
15527	85.157.0.0/16	16	RIPE NCC RPKI Root
31549	85.15.0.0/18	24	RIPE NCC RPKI Root

RPKI-Router Integration

- Local Validator Tool feeds RPKI capable router with processed data set
 - Router does not do the crypto!
- Implementations in beta by Cisco and Juniper
 - Public release in Q2, 2012
- Quagga has BGP Secure Routing Extensions
 - BGP-SRx open source reference implementation

Information and Announcements

<http://ripe.net/certification>

 #RPKI



Questions?



alexband@ripe.net



[alexander_band](https://twitter.com/alexander_band)



[linkedin.com/in/alexanderband](https://www.linkedin.com/in/alexanderband)

